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Abstract
A new procedure is presented for the objective comparison and evaluation of default definitions. This allows the
lender to find a default threshold at which the financial loss of a loan portfolio is minimised, in accordance with
Basel II. Alternative delinquency measures, other than simply measuring payments in arrears, can also be evaluated
using this optimisation procedure. Furthermore, a simulation study is performed in testing the procedure from
‘first principles’ across a wide range of credit risk scenarios. Specifically, three probabilistic techniques are used to
generate cash flows, while the parameters of each are varied, as part of the simulation study. The results show that
loss minima can exist for a select range of credit risk profiles, which suggests that the loss optimisation of default
thresholds can become a viable practice. The default decision is therefore framed anew as an optimisation problem
in choosing a default threshold that is neither too early nor too late in loan life. These results also challenges current
practices wherein default is pragmatically defined as ‘90 days past due’, with little objective evidence for its overall
suitability or financial impact, at least beyond flawed roll rate analyses or a regulator’s decree.
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A procedure for loss-optimising default definitions across simulated credit risk scenarios
1 Introduction
Consumer credit has exponentially grown over the last few decades, largely spurred by the introduction of the credit
card during the 1950s, as discussed in Thomas (2009, pp. 2–3). Retail credit is currently estimated at $13 trillion for
the US market, which largely consists of mortgages, credit cards, personal loans, vehicle financing, overdrafts and
other revolving loans for the individual, as reported in The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
(2018). For perspective, consumer debt in 2007 was 40% greater than total industry debt ($9.2 trillion) and more
than double total corporate debt ($5.8 trillion). Although greatest in the USA, consumer debt in other countries are
not far behind, e.g., the United Kingdom had debt levels in 2007 at £1.4 trillion – a staggering £400 billion growth
within the span of a mere three years. While Canada’s consumer debt is estimated at $666 billion, this figure also
constituted 110% of total annual household income. In fact, this trend of debt levels exceeding household income is
true for quite a few countries for the last twenty years, of which a few examples are shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Consumer household debt-to-income over annual periods by country, including Australia (AUS), Canada
(CAN), Finland (FIN), Greece (GRC), Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), and the United States of America
(USA). Reproduced from OECD (2018).
This credit growth, as argued in Thomas (2009, pp. 1–6) and Thomas (2010), could not have been possible
without a degree of automation, historically facilitated by statistical decision-making models otherwise known
as application credit scorecards. These models rendered consistent approve/decline credit decisions that enabled
greater application volumes whilst keeping default risk aligned with a lender’s risk appetite. This is mainly achieved
by only approving those applications with a predicted probability of default within a desired limit. Constructing
these scorecards involves finding a statistical relationship between a set of borrower-specific characteristics and the
successful (or failed) repayment outcome over time, using historical data. Naturally, the literature on credit scoring
is considerable, e.g., Hand and Henley (1997), Hand (2001), Thomas, Edelman and Crook (2002, pp. 2–6, 41–86),
Siddiqi (2005), Crook, Edelman and Thomas (2007), Hao, Alam and Carling (2010), and Louzada, Ara and
2
A procedure for loss-optimising default definitions across simulated credit risk scenarios
Fernandes (2016).
The advent of these automated models did, however, call for a more methodical manner of measuring default
before predicting the risk thereof. This includes capturing the development of loan delinquency over time, most
notably using the accountancy-based number of payments in arrears, as calculated from the number of days past
due. Specifically, the unpaid portion of an instalment is aged into several increasingly severe bins given the time
elapsed: 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, and so forth, as discussed in Cyert, Davidson and Thompson (1962). Using
these resulting arrears categories1, banks commonly specified three payments (or 90 days) in arrears as their point of
default, long before the introduction of the Basel II Capital Accords, which standardised default definitions to some
degree. This so-called ‘threshold’ is often pragmatically informed by managerial discretion, though supported by
some analysis, and generally ranges between 30–180 days, depending on data availability and the type of product, as
discussed in Thomas et al. (2002, pp. 123–124). However, the direct financial implications of any chosen definition
are not readily known, nor accounted for when deciding the point of default. Therefore, the pursuit of scorecard
modelling excellence becomes questionable when the constructed response variable itself, i.e., the binary ‘good/bad’
risk class that results from an applied default definition, is inherently arbitrary, as argued in Hand (2001).
According to Finlay (2010, pp. 11–13), should an account accrue sufficient arrears (despite increased collection
efforts), then the lender rather pursues debt recovery, including selling off any assets underlying the original credit
agreement. This is to say that every unpaid instalment erodes trust between bank and borrower but only up to a
certain point, as characterised by the default definition. This study attempts to frame this point (and finding it)
as a mathematical optimisation problem such that ‘default’ occurs neither too early nor too late during loan life.
Too strict a threshold will marginalise accounts that would have resumed repayment, had the bank not been too
brash in its default decision. Conversely, too lenient a threshold may prove naive in tolerating increasing arrears at
the cost of liquidity risk. Moreover, profitability ought to be used as the basis for this optimisation, as argued and
discussed in section 2 of this study. A procedure for this loss optimisation is then presented in section 3, along with
a simulation framework for testing this procedure across various credit risk profiles. In particular, three probabilistic
techniques are used to generate cash flows according to set parameters, which are then varied as part of the study.
Finally, the simulation results are discussed in section 4, which demonstrate that the loss optimisation of default
thresholds is a viable strategy for a select range of credit risk profiles.
2 A defining background on loan default
The estimation of the frequency of any event in a given sample fundamentally depends on the definition of the event.
This is to say that while loan ‘default’ lies intrinsic to credit risk (and its estimation), the phenomenon thereof
certainly has many definitions, both historically and in modern times. These definitions typically vary by product,
customer type, and bank, e.g., filing for bankruptcy, unfulfilled claims, negative net present values, overdrawing
beyond an agreed credit limit, as well as becoming three instalments in arrears, as discussed in Van Gestel and
Baesens (2009, pp. 203–212) and Baesens, Rösch and Scheule (2016, pp. 137–138). The Basel II Capital Accords
also standardised default definitions to some extent upon its introduction, while still leaving room for the lender’s
discretion. Specifically, paragraph 452 of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) defines ‘default’
1For credit lines, e.g., credit cards and overdrafts, ‘payments in arrears’ are technically irrelevant since there are no amortising
instalments. However, the number of days by which a facility is in excess of an agreed limit, can still be aged into these arrears categories.
The ‘instalment’ is simply the amount required to recover from this overdrawn status.
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as one of the following two conditions. Firstly (and perhaps more commonly-known), the obligor has reached
90 days past due (or three payments in arrears) on a material loan balance, or has been in excess of an advised
credit limit for 90 days. Alternatively, the bank considers, in its opinion, that the obligor is unlikely to repay its
obligations in full, without the necessary intervention of the bank, e.g., liquidating any collateral. To help inform
this opinion, Basel II also includes a few reasonable indicators of ‘default’, which are often promulgated verbatim
by a particular country’s regulator, e.g., Regulation 67 of the Banks Act of South Africa (2012, pp. 1201–1202) that
defines ‘default’ exactly the same way as in Basel II. At a minimum, these indicators include:
1. The bank assigns a non-accrued status to the debt, thereby no longer charging interest;
2. The bank writes down a portion of the debt, or raises a specific provision, since it believes credit quality has
significantly deteriorated;
3. The bank resolves to sell the debt at a material economic loss;
4. The bank files for the obligor’s bankruptcy;
5. The bank agrees to restructure the debt, which likely results in an overall reduced financial obligation;
6. The obligor files for bankruptcy (or is placed therein), which will likely either delay or circumvent repayment.
Most of these indicators (items 1–4) are retrospective in that they denote ‘default’ as a result of certain ex post
actions taken by a bank. However, these actions are only reasonably pursued after a bank has already resolved that
continuing the credit agreement is of little financial benefit. In other words, the trust between bank and borrower
has already eroded beyond a certain point, likely as a result of persistent non-payment. Consider that if reaching
this particular point already reflects ‘default’ in itself, then these specific default indicators do not signal ‘default’ as
much as they merely reaffirm what a bank already considers to be obvious. This suggests the fallacy of circular
reference, or petitio principii, on the premise of using these indicators in defining default when they themselves
are deduced by presumably the same default criteria. Lastly, items 5–6 ought to be considered more as possible
predictors of default, rather than indicating definite default at a certain point in time – even though default is
reasonably likely for those cases in practice.
Apart from Basel II, the three main external rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch) use their
own but not too dissimilar default definitions in guiding investment decisions on a wide range of counterparts, as
discussed in Van Gestel and Baesens (2009, pp. 115–117, 149–151, 208–209). While the original intent was to
indicate investment-grade debt securities (mainly government bonds), modern ratings cover a much larger spectrum
of companies and banks. In particular, Moody’s seeks to capture events that change the relationship between
bondholder and issuer, as its philosophy of default. All three agencies signal ‘default’ when interest and/or capital
portions go unpaid, although a variable grace period apply: one day for Moody’s, 10–30 days for the others. Also,
Moody’s does not consider technical defaults (e.g., covenant violations), while S&P does not consider the dividends
that are due from preferred stock as ‘financial obligations’ and, as such, do not count missed dividend payments as
defaults. Despite these nuanced differences amongst the three agencies, the aim of specifying a default definition is
the same as that of Basel II, which is to find a certain ‘point of no return’ at which most delinquent accounts will
remain delinquent and not recover.
In addition to using their discretion, lenders also perform a statistical exercise called a roll rate analysis to help
choose a default definition, as explained in Siddiqi (2005, pp. 33–42). This is best described as a cross-tabulation of
observed transition rates amongst pre-binned arrears categories across a chosen outcome period (e.g., 12 months).
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The principle is to set ‘default’ to the category at which most accounts do not recover (or ‘cure’) to less severe
categories, i.e., finding the ‘point of no return’. However, the choice of outcome period affects these roll rates
significantly, which typically varies between 6–24 months in practice, as discussed in Thomas et al. (2002, pp. 91)
and Van Gestel and Baesens (2009, pp. 101–102). In fact, the work of Kennedy, Mac Namee, Delany, O’Sullivan
and Watson (2013) experimented with different outcome periods in predicting default (using a constant definition
thereof). Classifier accuracy degraded as the outcome period lengthened, though shorter periods also gave volatile
default frequencies (due to seasonal effects). Moreover, too short a window may not adequately capture curing rates
due to maturity, while an overly long window may become divorced from current market conditions, or may simply
require more data than available. Longer windows may also ignore oscillations between defaulting and curing, as
discussed in Kelly and O’Malley (2016).
Using different default definitions were first explored in Harris (2013b) and Harris (2013a), wherein the model
accuracy of support vector machines predicting default are studied whilst employing various default definitions.
However, while optimising accuracy is certainly worthwhile, the implications of variable default definitions for
overall profitability are less clear. Moreover, the work of Hand and Henley (1997) argues that a lender is mainly
concerned with profitability when making a credit decision, and not as much with model accuracy. To that point,
loan profitability also depends on factors other than delinquency, e.g., the market response to a lender’s risk-based
pricing (higher interest rates for riskier borrowers), as explored in Phillips (2013). Another factor is the amount of
loss provisions raised today in covering expected credit losses tomorrow, as explained in Van Gestel and Baesens
(2009, pp. 38-74) and Finlay (2010, pp. 167–169). The recent introduction of IFRS 9, reviewed in Novotny-Farkas
(2016), Xu (2016), Cohen, Edwards Jr et al. (2017) and Skoglund (2017), also aligns this loss estimation closer to
capital reservation, which are meant to absorb unexpected losses. In both cases, quantifying credit risk consists of
estimating default risk (probability of default, or PD), loss risk (loss given default, or LGD), and exposure risk
(exposure at default, or EAD), as thoroughly discussed in Thomas (2009, pp. 289–293), Van Gestel and Baesens
(2009, chap. 4–6), and Baesens et al. (2016, chap. 5–11). Naturally, these three components rely on a consistent and
immutable default definition, similar to loan pricing, with variable default definitions largely unstudied in literature.
Although the exact reasons for retail credit defaults are innumerable (e.g., job loss, marital breakdown, financial
naivety, fraud), they are crudely grouped into either fraud (‘won’t pay’) or financial distress (‘can’t pay’), as explored
in Thomas (2009, pp. 282) and Bravo, Thomas and Weber (2015). Modelling the exact reason and its underlying
causes is challenging in practice since lenders rarely keep record of defaulting reasons. Instead, a more tangible
approach is to consider whether an impaired ability to repay is either persistent or temporary. Sufficient patience
on the lender’s part may allow certain financially-distressed borrowers enough time to recover and resume their
loan repayments, at the cost of accruing arrears and increased liquidity risk. On the other hand, too long a period
may prove naive with the lender partially recovering monies (if at all) at an opportunity cost. Specifying a default
threshold therefore serves as a margin of tolerance towards accruing arrears before pursuing debt recovery instead,
which aligns with the five-phase credit management model from Finlay (2010, pp. 11-13).
In fact, an arrears-based default definition was intrinsic to the double hurdle PD model developed in Moffatt (2005).
Both the payments in arrears (the ‘first’ hurdle) and the arrears amount itself (the ‘second’ hurdle) was used in
classifying overall ‘default’. This recognises that not all defaults are equal in their financial impact. The recent work
of Kelly and McCann (2016) also supports this notion, using mortgage defaults from the Irish market to model
so-called ‘deep defaults’ (360+ days in arrears). A legal peculiarity during 2009-2013 made it extremely difficult
for Irish lenders to liquidate defaulted mortgages, which led to an artificially high level of arrears. Banks had little
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recourse but to relax their risk aversion and adapt to so-called ‘deeper’ defaults as the new norm. If nothing else,
this particular instance casts doubt on both the meaning and supposed severity of the default decision itself as well
as using 90 days past due as the point of default.
In summary, varying the outcome period in a roll rate analysis will give different transition rates amongst arrears
categories, simply due to sampling. This presents additional uncertainty as certain outcome periods may obscure
idiosyncratic features of the loan portfolio. For example, it would be difficult to decide whether a particularly low
curing rate (estimated across a certain outcome period) is attributable to the risk profile of borrowers, a shift in
market conditions, or simply too short an outcome period – without conducting additional analysis. Furthermore,
the mere possibility of curing from default injects uncertainty into a chosen default definition, which is supposedly
the point at which the relationship between bank and borrower ultimately crumbles away. Finally, there is little
objective evidence for the presupposed profit-optimality of using Basel II’s 90 days past due as a sacrosanct default
definition. For these reasons, a new approach to finding optimal default definitions is deemed necessary, based on
profitability instead of model accuracy or roll rate analyses.
3 Optimising default thresholds: a simulation study
The term ‘delinquency’ is interpreted as a measurable and variable quantity that signifies the severity of eroded
trust between bank and borrower. A ‘delinquency measure’ g should then reflect the extent of non-payment
fundamentally based on a borrower owing It > 0 (instalment) though only repaying Rt ≥ 0 (receipt) at a particular
time t. The function g then measures delinquency by quantifying the extent It − Rt by which the borrower chips
away at the communal trust. For this study, three different delinquency measures (see appendix) are used:
1. The popular accountancy-based number of payments in arrears, called the Contractual Delinquency (or
CD-measure g1);
2. TheMacaulay Duration index-based measure (orMD-measure g2) from Sah (2015), which is an index of the
weighted average time to recover the capital portion of a loan;
3. A modified version of g2, called the Degree of Delinquency (or DoD-measure g3), which incorporates the
sizes of disrupted cash flows in assessing delinquency.
Regardless of g, a procedure is developed in this section for finding the ‘best’ default threshold from a portfolio
loss perspective. To test this procedure, a simulation framework is also described for generating various portfolios
across several credit risk scenarios.
3.1. A procedure for optimising default thresholds
Consider a portfolio of N loans, indexed by i = 1, . . . , N , and let g(i, t) denote the value of a particular measure
g ∈ {g1, g2, g3} at periods t = 0, . . . ,Ti with Ti representing the contractual term of the ith account. Let v(a)t and
v
(b)
t be standard actuarial discounting functions that respectively use an alternative risk-free interest rate and the
client interest rate in discounting back t periods. Let Rit and I it be the receipt and expected instalment respectively
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at time t for the ith account. Then, let R(i, t) be the summed historical receipts up to t, expressed as
R(i, t) =
t∑
l=0
Rilv
(a)
l
. (1)
For the remaining future instalments, let O(i, t) denote the expected outstanding balance at t, defined as
O(i, t) = v(a)t
Ti∑
l=t+1
I il v
(b)
l−t, O(i, t) = 0 for t = Ti . (2)
To cater for arrears, let A(i, t) be the historical and cumulative shortfall up to t between instalments and receipts,
given by
A(i, t) =
t∑
l=0
(
I il − Ril
)
v
(a)
l
. (3)
Financial loss can only be realised when the lender disposes of the impaired asset, regardless of the extent of
impairment. Having breached the default threshold (signifying broken trust), the lender’s objective changes to
collecting the maximum in the shortest time possible. However, changing the default threshold also implies a
variable workout period between the default time and eventual resolution, i.e., curing from default or write-off. As
a simplifying assumption for this study, the loan is immediately written-off at some rate upon entering ‘default’,
regardless of its definition. As such, let rE ∈ [0, 1] be a loss rate applied on O(i, t). Moreover, assume that A(i, t)
is also partly written-off though at another loss rate rA ∈ [0, 1]. Using two different rates recognises that the
recovery success may differ between these two components (expected balance and arrears). Finally, let l(i, t) be the
discounted loss assessed at t and expressed as
l(i, t) = O(i, t)rE + A(i, t)rA . (4)
In optimising default definitions, let d ≥ 0 be the default threshold such that the ith account is considered as
(g, d)-defaulting if and only if g(i, t) ≥ d at any particular time t = 1, . . . ,Ti. Accordingly, let SD be the subset of
all (g, d)-defaulting accounts such that
SD =
{
i
 ∃ t ∈ [0,Ti] : g(i, t) ≥ d} . (5)
Since an account may enter and leave the ‘default’ state multiple times in reality, let t(g,d)i be the earliest moment of
default for the ith (g, d)-defaulting account, defined as
t(g,d)i = min
(
t : g(i, t) ≥ d), ∀ i ∈ SD . (6)
Similarly, let SP be the subset of all accounts considered as (g, d)-performing such that
SP =
{
i : g(i, t) < d ∀ t ∈ [0,Ti]
}
. (7)
The difference in assessing losses using Eq. 4 between a (g, d)-defaulting and a (g, d)-performing account is simply
the time of assessment t, at either t = t(g,d)i or t = Ti respectively. Finally, the discounted total loss L(g, d) of a
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given matured portfolio using the measure g and a default threshold d, is defined as
L(g, d) =
∑
i∈ SD
l
(
i, t(g,d)i
)
+
∑
i∈ SP
l (i,Ti) . (8)
Fig. 2. Illustrating the loss optimisation of default thresholds across several delinquency measures. As a result,
Measure 3 is chosen as the best measure with its minimum loss attained at point c.
Losses can now be iteratively calculated across a range of thresholds d ∈ Dg using a particular measure
g ∈ {g1, g2, g3} with the loss model (Eq. 8), thereby forming a loss curve across d for each g. To populate these
thresholds in Dg, choose a sufficiently wide range of discrete thresholds d = 0, . . . , dN using g1 as a baseline. This
dN is arbitrarily chosen as 60% of the contractual term in balancing computation time against the desired width of
the eventual loss curve. Next, the ranges of real-valued measures g2 and g3 are binned into the same number of
thresholds using a combination of equal width discretisation and discretion. In summary, Dg contains an equal
number of thresholds for each measure g in the loss optimisation, which is accompanied by two preparatory steps:
1. Delinquency must be measured for every account and across its history using g ∈ {g1, g2, g3};
2. A loss model L(g, d) must be applied at every relevant default threshold d ∈ Dg.
Finally, losses are aggregated twice by finding the minimum each time: first by threshold d for g and then by measure
g. This forms the basis of the loss optimisation procedure. Specifically, each resulting loss curve – one for each
measure g – can first be inspected to find the lowest loss as well as the associated threshold for each minimum loss.
Secondly, these minima m(g), i.e.,min L(g, d) = m(g), coinciding at thresholds d(g), i.e., argd min L(g, d) = d(g),
can then be compared to one another. The optimal measure g∗ is then the one that yielded the lowest loss m(g) at
corresponding threshold d(g), i.e., g∗ = argg minm(g), as illustrated in Fig. 2. Note that this procedure can also be
used for loss-optimising the threshold using a single measure g1.
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3.2. An overview of simulation techniques
A real-world portfolio inherently suffers from censoring insofar that delinquent loans are only kept on the balance
sheet up to a certain point, as controlled by the bank’s policies. Alternatively, a simulation-based approach is more
conducive to studying threshold optimisation from ‘first principles’ since a whole range of credit risk profiles and
associated assumptions can be simulated, contrasted by a real-world portfolio’s single profile. Moreover, some
delinquent accounts will simply never recover in reality, which implies a continuous stream of zeros in their receipts
R =
[
R1, R2, . . . , Rtc
]
after some point. Given a measure g ∈ {g1, g2, g3} and a so-called truncation parameter
k ≥ 0, this effect is simulated at a certain starting point t ′ = min ( j : g( j) ≥ k ) that only exists when delinquency
has accrued sufficiently, i.e., the earliest period j ∈ [0, tc] at which g( j) ≥ k is potentially triggered. A process,
called (k, g)-truncation, then changes R to R′ by
R′ =

[
R1, R2, . . . , Rt′, 0, . . . , 0
]
if t ′ exists
R otherwise
. (9)
For the actual simulation study, consider N = 10, 000 standard amortising loan accounts that are indexed by
i = 1, . . . , N , with a fixed contractual term of tc = 60 months, a fixed effective annual interest rate of 20%, and a
fixed principal amount such that the level instalment is It = 100 at every period t = 1, . . . , tc. An effective annual
risk-free rate of 7% is used in discounting, which is realistic for the South African market. Let the maximum
loan size be LM = 5, 000 and let rE = 40% and rA = 70% with the rationale that losses on arrears ought to be
penalised more than losses on expected balances. This is due to the latter being a decreasing quantity while the
former increases over time for a continuously delinquent loan.
In simulating the receipt vector R of each loan account, three probabilistic techniques are now described. As a basic
technique (called random defaults), let ut ∈ [0, 1] be a randomly generated number at every period t = 1, . . . , tc and
let b be the probability of payment, i.e., P(Rt = I) = b with I denoting the level instalment. Note that b = 80% is
chosen as a default value, though this is later varied. Each element Rt within R is then populated with either I or 0,
expressed as
Rt =

I if ut < b
0 otherwise
. (10)
Despite its simplicity, random defaults do not feasibly generate periods of consecutive non-payments followed
by resumed payment, which frequently occurs in practice. Therefore, the so-called episodic defaults technique is
also used wherein pD = 50% is the given probability of default, i.e., half the portfolio is bound to have a default
episode by design. Let lj be the number of consecutive non-payments to be simulated for the j th delinquent account
within the defaulting-segment. This episode length lj ∈ [1, k] is sampled from the uniform distribution up to k,
coinciding with (k, g1)-truncation. When applying (k, g1)-truncation, accounts will only cure if they had less than k
consecutive non-payments, as a limiting condition. Thereafter, the starting point oj ∈ [1, tc − lj] of the episode
is also sampled from the uniform distribution up to tc − lj , which is to say the entire episode must fit within the
remaining loan life. Finally, each element Rt within R of the j th delinquent account is then simulated as
Rt =

0 if oj ≤ t ≤ (oj + lj)
I otherwise
. (11)
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Realistically, an account may experience multiple default episodes during its life, though the previous episodic
technique only gives one such episode. Therefore, the Markovian defaults technique is also defined wherein
Xt ∈ {P,D} denotes a random variable that can assume one of two states at each period t; the state P : Rt = I
(paid) and the state D : Rt = 0 (delinquent). Then, let X1, X2, . . . be a sequence of random variables that form a
discrete-time first-order Markov chain. For simplicity, assume that every accounts starts off in the paying state,
which implies that the initial state probabilities are P(X1 = P) = 1 and P(X1 = D) = 0. Subsequently, the given
transition probabilities between states at future time t + 1, conditional on the current state at time t, are denoted by
the transition matrix as[
PPP PPD
PDP PDD
]
=
[
P
(
Xt+1 = P
 Xt = P) P (Xt+1 = D  Xt = P)
P
(
Xt+1 = P
 Xt = D) P (Xt+1 = D  Xt = D)
]
=
[
PPP 1 − PPP
1 − PDD PDD
]
. (12)
4 Simulation results of loss optimisation
Following the aforementioned simulation approach, the parameters of each technique are now varied while
optimising the default thresholds towards the lowest loss. The simulation results are grouped below by technique.
4.1. Random defaults
(a) Using (4, g1)-truncation (b) Using (6, g3)-truncation
Fig. 3. Losses (as a proportion of summed principals) across thresholds d by measure g ∈ {g1, g2, g3} using the
random defaults technique. In (a), simulated loans are (4, g1)-truncated, while they are (6, g3)-truncated in (b). The
zoomed plots show that global minima occur at or near the truncation point, d = k, in both cases.
In using this technique, (k, g)-truncation is applied to control the simulation and to serve as a sanity check. Intuitively,
one expects that the lowest loss across default thresholds d to coincide wherever d = k, since simulated receipts are
zeroed after having breached k. As an illustration, (4, g1) is first applied in Fig. 3a, which shows the lowest loss to
occur at d = 4 for g1. Note that k is arbitrarily set, though varied later. However, the choice of g ∈
{
g1, g2, g3
}
when applying (k, g)-truncation also introduces bias in the timing of these simulated non-payments. Specifically,
10
A procedure for loss-optimising default definitions across simulated credit risk scenarios
the lowest loss (across all curves) is biased towards the curve of the same g used in truncation. As shown in Fig. 3b,
when using (6, g3)-truncation instead, minimum loss now occurs approximately at d = k = 6 for g3.
In general, minimum losses ought to occur wherever d = k when (k, g)-truncating simulated receipts. This is largely
confirmed in Fig. 4 wherein various portfolios are generated in succession using different truncation parameters
k = 1, . . . , 10. As a result, loss minima occur consistently at the truncation point d = k. Each increasing value
of k also yielded a smaller minimum loss as a result of the overall lessening truncation effect. Since receipts
are truncated less frequently as k increases, portfolios exhibit less delinquency, which explains both lower loss
curves and lower loss minima. Although not shown, this behaviour is also true for g2 and g3 with associated
(k, g)-truncation, though minima only occur approximately at d = k ± η with the discrepancy η becoming greater
as k increases.
Fig. 4. Losses (as a proportion of summed principals) across thresholds d for the CD-measure g1 with (k, g1)-
truncation, using the random defaults technique. Several truncation points k = 1, . . . , 10 are used, with the zoomed
plot confirming that global minima in losses occur at each truncation point d = k.
The effect of different credit risk profiles during loss optimisation is simulated by varying the parameter b and
generating portfolios accordingly, as shown in Fig. 5. Keeping (6, g1)-truncation as a benchmark, loss minima
only occur at d = k = 6 for a certain range of 0.5 < b < 0.94. This suggests that loss minima may only exist for
certain risk profiles in practice. Moreover, the two boundary cases of b = 0 and b = 1 in Fig. 5 also serve as a
reasonableness test in that the loss minimum should occur at d = 0 for b = 0 since all receipts will be zero by
design. Conversely, if there is no credit risk, i.e., b = 1, then zero losses should occur across all thresholds d > 0
since all receipts equal instalments. Credit risk scenarios can also be simulated by varying the loss rate rA and
generating associated portfolios, as shown in Fig. 6 using g1 (though similar results hold for g2 and g3). Decreasing
values of rA flattens the loss curve, which is sensible since arrears are penalised less. Conversely, increasing values
of rA causes a greater ‘bend’ at the chosen truncation point, while loss minima materialises at the same point only
for a certain range of rA. This strengthens the previous result of loss optimisation across default thresholds being
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viable only for portfolios with particular risk profiles – not too much risk nor too little risk.
Fig. 5. Losses (as a proportion of summed principals) across thresholds d for the CD-measure g1 with (6, g1)-
truncation, using the random defaults technique and several probabilities of payment b ∈ [0, 1]. The zoomed plot
shows a smaller range of 0.65 ≤ b ≤ 0.91 where loss minima occur at the chosen truncation point.
4.2. Episodic defaults
Since this technique is tightly coupled with (k, g1)-truncation by design, portfolios are generated accordingly for
k = 1, . . . , 10, as shown in Fig. 7 for g1 (with similar results for g2 and g3). Clearly, the shapes of loss curves are
different, even though loss minima are still found at each successive truncation point. Also note that accounts
resume payment provided that the length of their default episode is less than k. Then, longer default episodes (higher
k) seems to absorb the loss specifically introduced by truncation itself, which is signified by flattening loss curves
for d ≥ k. Since higher k also implies that truncation occurs less frequently, a greater proportion of accounts with
default episode length less than k will resume payment. In turn, arrears stabilise as truncation becomes less likely,
which explains the flattening slopes of loss curves for greater k. In general then, small k implies shorter episode
lengths but more truncated accounts, while large k means longer episode lengths but less truncated accounts. It
seems this technique generates portfolios with an interesting trade-off between default episode length and truncation
frequency, regarding their credit risk compositions. Since loss minima are still obtained at each truncation point
as hoped, it suggests that loss-optimising default thresholds will likely remain viable in practice when facing
portfolios with more interesting characteristics. This includes portfolios where truly delinquent accounts (as proxy
for truncation) occur more frequently (e.g., unsecured lending), though accounts are also more prone to recover
from shorter bouts of delinquency, and vice versa.
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Fig. 6. Losses (as a proportion of summed principals) across thresholds d for the CD-measure g1 with (6, g1)-
truncation, using the random defaults technique and several arrears loss rates rA ∈ [0, 1]. The zoomed plot shows a
smaller range of loss rates 0.62 ≤ rA ≤ 1 where loss minima occur at the chosen truncation point.
Fig. 7. Losses (as a proportion of summed principals) across thresholds d for the CD-measure g1 with (k, g1)-
truncation, using the episodic defaults technique with pD = 50% and several truncation points k = 1, . . . , 10. The
zoomed plot shows that loss minima occur at each successive truncation point.
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4.3. Markovian defaults
Using this technique, various credit risk contexts are simulated by substituting in a range of transition rates
PPP ∈ [0, 1], while keeping PDD = 1 constant at first, as shown in Fig. 8a for g1 (though similar results hold for
g2 and g3). For PPP = 0, accounts are immediately absorbed into the delinquency state D since PDD = 1, thereby
yielding a minimum loss at d = 0 . Similarly, for PPP = 1, accounts will never leave the payment state P, which
explains the zero loss curve across d > 0. As before, loss minima exist only for a limited range of 0.5 ≤ PPP ≤ 0.988
at d = 1, as a proxy for credit risk in practice. Curiously, loss minima at d = 1 amounts to an unintended (and
rather strict) (1, g1)-truncation effect due to specifying PDD = 1. In this case, any laxer truncation using k > 1 will
also be indiscernible in effect due to the superseding absorption of PDD = 1. However, (k, g)-truncation ought to
have a more visible effect when using more transient rates PDD → 0 later. Lastly, as another reasonableness check,
the previous results in Fig. 3 can be emulated using Markovian defaults by specifying PPP = 0.9 and PDD = 0.6,
whilst using the same (4, g1) and (6, g3)-truncation respectively.
The range of rates PPP ∈ [bL, bU ] wherein loss minima occur at d = 1 depends on PDD, based on the simple
premise that it becomes less taxing to enter the delinquency state D, if one is also more prone to exit it again. To
demonstrate this, three reference values for PDD ∈ {0.85, 0.6, 0.4} are experimentally chosen as boundary cases.
Fixing PDD = 0.85, the range [bL, bU ] shifts lower and narrows, eventually contracting to a single point as PDD
is decreased, until it disappears when PDD < 0.35. Moreover, loss minima at other thresholds d > 1 (without
applying (k, g1)-truncation) also appear for an upper non-overlapping range bU ≤ PPP < 1 when PDD = 0.85. As
PDD is decreased, this range widens, e.g., becoming 0.7 ≤ PPP < 1 when PDD = 0.6. The Markov chain becomes
increasingly unstable for certain PPP as PDD is decreased since accounts start switching rapidly between states P
and D. Should this oscillation occur relatively early in loan life, then losses are higher owing to high expected
outstanding balances. As a consequence, global loss maxima can start appearing when PDD ≤ 0.6 for certain PPP,
e.g., the range 0.35 ≤ PPP ≤ 0.55 when PDD = 0.4 and no truncation.
By applying (25, g1)-truncation and fixing PDD = 0.4, the aforementioned ideas are clearly manifesting in Fig. 8b.
Firstly, it shows a diminishing range 0.46 < PPP < 0.53 wherein loss minima at d = 1 are still found, owing to the
majority being absorbed into delinquency. Secondly, an upper range 0.53 < PPP ≤ 0.65 exhibits loss minima at the
chosen truncation point d = k, which is purposefully set high to distinguish from the previous loss minima at d = 1.
For PPP > 0.65, fewer accounts become (or stay) delinquent, which explains both the waning strength of truncation
and the flattening loss curve at d ≥ k. Lastly, a small range 0.53 < PPP < 0.59 also has loss maxima, though the
range expands significantly to PPP < 0.59 when removing truncation. Although believed to be a simulation artefact,
the existence of loss maxima suggests an interesting dilemma wherein greater losses are attained when choosing
some middling d than what would have been the case when choosing either an incredibly conservative threshold
(e.g., d = 0) or remarkably naive threshold (e.g., d = 40). Loss maxima can reasonably occur in practice, e.g.,
real-world portfolios undergoing temporary macroeconomic stress, though further research is necessary.
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(a)With transition rate PDD = 1
(b) With transition rate PDD = 0.4 and (25, g1)-truncation
Fig. 8. Losses (as a proportion of summed principals) across thresholds d for the CD-measure g1, using the
Markovian defaults technique with several transition rates PPP ∈ [0, 1]. In (a), PDD = 1 is fixed with loss minima
occurring for 0.5 ≤ PPP ≤ 0.988 at d = 1, highlighted in the zoomed plot. In (b), PDD = 0.4 is fixed with
(25, g1)-truncation wherein the zoomed plot shows an even smaller range of rates 0.46 < PPP < 0.53 where loss
minima still occur at d = 1. Lighter encircled points show rates 0.53 < PPP ≤ 0.65 where loss minima occur at the
chosen truncation point d = k. Darker encircled points show rates 0.53 < PPP < 0.59 where loss maxima occur at
staggered thresholds.
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5 Conclusion
Basel II, often promulgated verbatim by a country’s financial regulator, allows the lender reasonable freedom to
define their own default points. Yet many lenders pragmatically opt for the common ‘90 days past due’-definition and
use it accordingly across collection operations, analytics, pricing, and risk modelling, amongst others. Moreover,
the financial implications of a particular definition are not readily considered when choosing a default point. There
is often little objective evidence for a definition’s overall suitability, beyond the questionable results from roll rate
analyses or a regulator’s decree.
Therefore, a procedure is presented in this study for optimising the default threshold using profitability (or loss) as its
base. To facilitate this optimisation, three delinquency measures are formulated (see appendix). Each measure g is
applied on the historical cash flows of all loan accounts within a portfolio. Thereafter, the loss L(g, d) is calculated
for each relevant default threshold d, resulting in a loss curve for each g. A loss curve can then be inspected to find
the threshold at which the lowest loss occurs, which concludes the loss optimisation. This procedure also allows for
the objective comparison and evaluation across multiple delinquency measures, should a lender wish to employ (or
test) alternative measures.
In testing this procedure, a simulation study is conducted to generate loan portfolios across a wide range of credit
risk scenarios. Three probabilistic techniques are used to generate cash flows, with each technique aiming for
increased realism over the previous one. A simulation study allows for varying the parameters of each technique,
thereby producing different risk profiles and portfolio characteristics. This is particularly useful for testing the loss
optimisation procedure from ‘first principles’. Indeed, the simulation results show that loss minima can exist for a
select range of credit risk profiles, which suggests that loss-optimising default thresholds can be a viable strategy
in practice. These results also successfully frames the default decision as an optimisation problem in choosing a
default threshold that is neither too early nor too late in loan life.
Future studies can focus on using real-world portfolio data in refining this procedure. Most real portfolios are
censored (or ‘incomplete’) since the majority of loan accounts have not yet reached maturity, excluding written-off
and settled accounts. This is a non-trivial challenge since the procedure was developed with ‘completed’ accounts
in mind. Furthermore, the particular loss model, as used in the procedure, can be refined and made estimable
from real-world loss experiences. As an example, the LGD can perhaps be restructured in a way that allows for
estimating loss risk conditioned on a particular default definition, amongst other factors. This will intersect with the
existing literature on credit loss modelling, which is currently enjoying greater research focus due to IFRS 9.
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6 Appendix – Measures of loan delinquency
Three mathematical operations are now presented as delinquency measures and discussed. Firstly, the popular
number of payments/months in arrears, called the Contractual Delinquency (or CD-measure g1), is refined into
a more robust measure. Secondly, a more concise algorithm is contributed that creates the Macaulay Duration
index-based measure (or MD-measure g2) from Sah (2015), which is an index of the weighted average time to
recover the capital portion of a loan. Finally, a modified version of theMD-measure is introduced, called the Degree
of Delinquency (or DoD-measure g3), which incorporates the sizes of disrupted cash flows in assessing delinquency.
6.1. CD-measure g1
As a common measure, the unpaid portion of an amortising loan’s instalment is aged into a few increasingly severe
bins, given the time elapsed: 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, and so forth, as discussed in Cyert et al. (1962). This is
often converted to the number of payments in arrears (or arrears categories) simply by dividing the accumulated
arrears at a particular point in time with the level instalment, followed by rounding this ratio upwards to an integer.
However, this is quite stringent in that even a small difference It − Rt =  < 1 will increase the payments in arrears,
purely due to rounding. Should the ratio instead be rounded to the nearest integer, then a change in this measure
depends on whether the unrounded ratio is above or below 50%. This implied ‘threshold’ seems arbitrary and
too fixed. Furthermore, this measure can potentially lag overall measurement when a significant overpayment is
immediately followed by a severe underpayment the following month. Lastly, its construction quickly becomes
cumbersome when the instalment is prime rate-linked and varies over time, which is common for secured lending.
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Therefore, a more comprehensive variant, called theCD-measure, is presented here that circumvents these challenges.
Let the receipt vector be R = [R0, R1, . . . , RT ] with its elements (or receipts) Rt ≥ 0, and let the instalment vector be
I = [I0, I1, . . . , IT ] with its elements It > 0. Both vectors are defined for a specific loan account across its discrete
time periods t = 0, . . . ,T , with t = 0 representing the origination point and T denoting the tenure (or current loan
age). Note that T may exceed the contractual term tc, especially in cases of extreme delinquency. The repayment
ratio ht ∈ [0,∞) is then defined as
ht =
(
Rt
It
)
∀ t = 1, . . . ,T and h0 = 0 . (13)
One can specify a certain threshold z ∈ [0, 1] for ht , above which an account at time t is considered current and
beneath which it is considered delinquent. Note that z = 90% is assumed in this study as an illustration. Next, a
Boolean-valued decision function d1(t) ∈ {0, 1} is defined for t = 1, . . . ,T , using Iverson brackets [a] that outputs
1 if the enclosed statement a is true, and 0 if false, as
d1(t) =
[
ht < z
]
. (14)
Memory of past delinquency is introduced by defining another integer-valued function m(t) ∈ {−1, 0, 1, . . . } for
t = 1, . . . ,T , which outputs the reduction in accrued delinquency (if any), as
m(t) =
(⌊
ht
z
⌋
− 1
) (
1 − d1(t)
)
− d1(t)
=
⌊
ht
z
⌋ (
1 − d1(t)
)
− 1 . (15)
This function m(t) gives the magnitude by which the measured delinquency at time t should be reduced (if at all) in
catering for past delinquency. When overpaying, i.e., Rt > It , the ratio between ht and z in Eq. 15 signifies the total
number of ‘payments’ by which accrued delinquency should be decreased. The floor is taken since g1 should reflect
payments in arrears and must therefore have a discrete scale. However, the currently owed instalment should be
recognised first before reducing any accrued delinquency, by subtracting one instalment. For underpayment, i.e.,
Rt < zIt , the delinquency is increased by one payment, which resolves to m(t) = −1 when d1(t) = 1.
To indicate previous cases of delinquency using g1 at time t − 1, let d2(t) ∈ {0, 1} be another Boolean-valued
decision function for t = 1, . . . ,T , which is defined using Iverson brackets again, as
d2(t) =
[
g1(t − 1) = 0
]
. (16)
Finally, the reduction in delinquency m(t) at time t is subtracted from delinquency measured at the previous period
t − 1, thereby giving the net number of payments in arrears respective to z. The integer-valued CD-measure
g1(t) ≥ 0 for t = 1, . . . ,T is then recursively expressed as
g1(t) = max
[
0, d1(t)d2(t) +
(
1 − d2(t)
) (
g1(t − 1) − m(t)
)]
. (17)
Note the necessary starting condition of g1(0) = 0, since a newly-disbursed loan account cannot yet be delinquent.
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6.2. MD-measure g2
Recently introduced in Sah (2015), the Macaulay Duration Index is based on bond duration, i.e., the weighted
average time to recover the capital portion of a loan. By comparing actual duration to expected duration, it
incorporates interest rates and the time value of money of arrears amounts in assessing delinquency. Naturally,
its output cannot be compared directly to the previous g1 since both its scale and meaning differs. To ease the
construction of g2, a new algorithm is presented here.
Let ∆t = It − Rt be the difference between the instalment It and the receipt Rt at every time point t = 0, . . . ,T of a
loan account, including at disbursement t = 0 (to capture any account initiation fees). Considering the time value
of money, let vj = (1 + r)−j be a discounting function that uses a nominal monthly interest rate r . In addition, let δ
be the continuously compounded rate with its nominal variant δ(p) = δ/p and with an annual compounding period
p. Let LP denote the loan amount (or principal) that is to be amortised. While the Macaulay Duration is ordinarily
calculated at origination as the weighted average time to recover cash flows, here it is recursively calculated instead
at each subsequent period t = 0, . . . ,T across the remaining m instalments. Naturally, this expected duration
quantity, denoted as fED(t), tends towards zero over time as it nears the end of loan life, expressed as
fED(t) =
T∑
m=t
[(
Imv(m−t)
LP
) (
m − t
p
)]
∀ t = 0, . . . ,T . (18)
However, Eq. 18 assumes that instalments I are free of uncertainty. A marked difference is reasonably expected
when substituting these instalments with the actual receipts R. Moreover, it becomes necessary to track the arrears
balance as it develops (if it does) over the loan life. In line with Sah (2015), any arrears at any time are added to the
last expected (contractual) instalment at t = tc , since it represents the last contractual opportunity to repay any such
arrears, short of the lender intervening and restructuring the loan. This last instalment is then recursively updated
for each subsequent period t, denoted by the vector I ′, which equals instalments I at first. Likewise, the actual
duration f AD(t) is also recursively calculated for each subsequent period t. This is illustrated using pseudo-code in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Calculating g2
1: I ′ := I , where I =
[
I0, . . . , IT
]
and T ≤ tc
2: f AD(0) := fED(0)
3: for t = 0, . . . ,T do . such that T ≤ tc
4: I ′(T ) := I
′
T + ∆t
(
1 + δ
(p)
p
)T−t
, ∀ t = 1, . . . ,T . Add any arrears to I ′(T )
5: f AD(t) := ∑T | T ≤tcm=t [( I ′mv(m−t )LP ) (m−tp )], ∀ t = 1, . . . ,T
6: end for
Finally, the real-valued Macaulay Duration (MD) measure g2(t) ≥ 0 is then defined as the ratio between the actual
duration and the expected duration at time points t = 0, . . . ,T − 1, which is expressed as
g2(t) =
f AD(t)
fED(t) . (19)
20
A procedure for loss-optimising default definitions across simulated credit risk scenarios
6.3. DoD-measure g3
From a cash flow perspective, an ideal delinquency measurement should penalise the non-payment of a larger loan’s
instalment to a greater degree than that of a smaller loan’s instalment, given the relatively larger impact on a bank’s
cash flow. Furthermore, the differences in risk concentration between a larger number of small loans versus a small
number of larger loans should also be incorporated by the ideal delinquency measure. As a possible solution, the
actual duration f AD(t) from Eq. 19 can be altered such that the eventual g2(t) is greater for larger loans than for
smaller loans by defining an appropriate multiplier function.
Whilst refining g2, note that it is only defined up to the contractual term tc. However, delinquency can continue
even past its contractual term T ≥ tc , likely due to persisting underpayment. Ignoring loan write-off policies for the
moment, let d3(t) ∈ {0, 1} be a Boolean-valued decision function that returns 1 if the given time point t precedes
the contractual term tc, and 0 if otherwise. Using Iverson brackets, this is expressed as
d3(t) =
[
t ≤ tc
]
. (20)
When t > tc , any arrears can clearly no longer be added to the last contractual instalment (since it has lapsed), as was
added for I ′T at T = t when calculating g2 in Algorithm 1. Instead, at least one more payment, albeit out-of-contract,
can reasonably be expected at every subsequent period t : t ≥ tc as long as collection efforts are actively pursued.
Therefore, delinquency can now be computed up to time T instead of the previous T , with T either representing the
contractual term tc when t < tc, or becoming a moving target T = t when t ≥ tc. Note that both I and R will
incrementally expand with additional elements for as long as collection efforts continues past the contractual term.
A revised algorithm is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Calculating g3
1: I ′ := I , where I =
[
I0, . . . , IT
]
and 0 < tc ≤ T
2: T := tc
3: for t = 0, . . . ,T do
4: α := I ′(T ) . This refers to the element at the T th position of I ′
5: T := tcd3(t) + t
(
1 − d3(t)
)
. T is either equal to tc or to t ≥ tc
6: I ′(T ) := I
′
(T )d3(t) + ∆t
(
1 + δ
(p)
p
)T −t
+ α
(
1 − d3(t)
) (
1 + δ
(p)
p
)
, ∀ t = 1, . . . ,T
7: β(m) := m − t + 1 − d3(t), ∀ t = 1, . . . ,T . Discounting periods, used in next two lines
8: fED(t) := ∑Tm=t [( Imvβ(m)LP ) ( β(m)p )], ∀ t = 0, . . . ,T
9: f AD(t) := fED(t), for t = 0
10: f AD(t) := ∑Tm=t [( I ′mvβ(m)LP ) ( β(m)p )], ∀ t = 1, . . . ,T
11: end for
Afterwards, let λ(LM, LP, s) denote a multiplier function that inflates f AD(t) at the period t. Let LM denote the
maximum loan size and let s ∈ [0, 1] be a real-valued sensitivity that represents the ‘strength’ at which to apply
this inflationary effect. Let d4(t) ∈ {0, 1} be another Boolean-valued decision function that returns 1 if there is
currently any accrued delinquency at t, and 0 otherwise, defined using Iverson brackets as
d4(t) =
[
f AD(t) > fED(t)
]
. (21)
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As a simple example, this multiplier is defined as
λ(LM, LP, s) = s
(
1 − LM − LP
LM
)
. (22)
The inflated variant of f AD(t), denoted as f˜ AD(t), is given by
f˜ AD(t) = f AD(t)
(
d4(t)λ(LM, LP, s) + 1
)
. (23)
By including d4(t) into f˜ AD(t) in Eq. 23, accrued delinquency will not be inflated when overpaying at some period
t. Finally, the real-valued Degree of Delinquency (DoD) measure g3(t) ≥ 0 is defined for t = 0, . . . ,T − 1 and
expressed as
g3(t) =
f˜ AD(t)
fED(t) =
(
g2(t)
f AD(t)
)
f˜ AD(t) = g2(t)
(
d4(t)λ(LM, LP, s) + 1
)
. (24)
The sensitivity s, which is fixed in this study at s = 100% (though should ideally be optimised), represents a
universal and intuitive lever at the lender’s disposal. Its adjustment can align with the lender’s particular risk
appetite and tolerances. At s = 0, g3 collapses back into g2, though it purposefully resembles a more risk-adverse
form of g2 for s > 0. Delinquency values are more varied than those of g2 due to the inherent sensitivity to loan
principals by design.
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